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Background
• Study goal: using selected flight test/early operations mishap
investigations, identify recurring factor patterns and provide results
to current human spaceflight programs to inform and stimulate
their mishap risk management efforts.
– “The NESC gains insight into the technical activities of
programs/projects through…systems engineering reviews and
independent trend or pattern analyses of program/project technical
problems, technical issues, mishaps, and close calls within and across
programs/projects.” (NESC Management Plan)
– "The NSC will conduct …special studies…at the request of Centers,
programs and projects to provide trends within Centers, programs,
projects, or facility activities.“ (NSC Implementation Plan)
• “Safety through engineering and technical excellence”
– Everybody is responsible for safety, but is everybody accountable for
safety?
– Accountability = Responsibility x Authority x Capability (Bryan
O’Connor)
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Safety Accountability vs. Responsibility
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t-jlwW7ppvA
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Background (continued)
• Study evolution:
– Shuttle Human Factors Team and Model (1990’s - early 2000’s)
– Columbia – systemic/recurring factor analysis methodology
development (2003-2006)
– Shuttle Ground Processing Mishap Study – post Columbia; focus on
safe fly-out for flight and ground crews (2006-2011)
– Shuttle Workforce Message from Bob Crippen (2010)
– “Tough Transitions” STS-1 System Failure Case Study (2011)
– Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) Ground Test and Checkout – recurring
factor review of significant close calls (2012)
MSL Ground Processing Close Calls
• Inadvertent crane “up” command after lifting and
connecting the MSL Descent Stage Simulator (DSS) to the
flight backshell interface
• Shipping GSE not removed before drill percussion test
• Cable installed in reversed position on flight fluid pump
• Flight Drill Bit Assembly (DBA) second alignment not
performed
5www.youtube.com/watch?v=5vfyZtVPvfs
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Excerpt from the STS-1 System Failure Case Study
“Tragedy has marred the start of every human spaceflight program since
three American astronauts were lost in the 1967 Apollo-1 fire: a Russian
cosmonaut died when his spacecraft, Soyuz 1, plummeted to Earth after a
parachute deployment failure; NASA’s Space Shuttle Program endured an
inauspicious beginning when three technicians were asphyxiated in the aft
compartment while preparing STS-1 for launch; and the first commercial
spaceflight suffered a setback when three Scaled
Composites employees perished while
performing a cold flow nitrous oxide test.
In addition, the first orbiting space station,
Skylab, was nearly lost during Skylab-1,
and a ground crew fatality was narrowly
avoided during preparations for the Ares
1-X test flight in the Parachute
Refurbishment Facility at KSC.”
“No one wants to learn by mistakes, but
we cannot learn enough from successes to
go beyond the state of the art.”
Henry Petrosky, To Engineer is Human http://nsc.nasa.gov/SFCS/
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Major Insights from Shuttle and MSL
Mishap Risk Reduction Efforts
• Need an appropriate systems model as the basis for the
analysis
• Organizational system-level issues recur because they are
hard to fix
– No silver bullets; requires sustained, data-driven effort
• Need to evaluate all contributing factors and causes
– Because a contributing factor can be a cause in a different situation or on another
day, and vice-versa
“Swiss Cheese Model of Organizational Defenses”
Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents,
James Reason
Carrots and Crabgrass
(Different Types of Roots)
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“I would hasten to add there isn't a root cause. It's a bad term. There are many causes
and contributing factors, and to say that there's just one, I would doubt you could ever
show an event that there was just one cause. There might be one principal cause, but
there are many that, you know, contribute to in sum total end up with a bad event. And
you have to look at the myriad of things that contribute to a bad event.”
Dr. James Bagian during an 8/9/10 NPR panel discussion on “What Can be Done to Avoid Man-Made
Disasters”
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Human Spaceflight (HSF)-1 Mishaps
Apollo-1 Crew Module Fire
at Launch Complex 34
January 27, 1967
Loss of Flight Crew (3)
Soyuz-1 Main and Reserve
Parachute Failures During
Reentry
April 24, 1967
Loss of Flight Crew (1)
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HSF-1 Mishaps (continued)
Skylab-1 Loss of
Meteoroid Shield During
Launch Ascent
May 14, 1973
Rescue Mission Needed to Save the
Orbital Workshop
STS-1 Oxygen Deficiency
in Aft Compartment at
Launch Complex 39A
March 19, 1981
Loss of Ground Crew (3)
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HSF-1 Mishaps (continued)
Scaled Composites
Ground Explosion During
Cold Flow N2O Test
July 26, 2007
Loss of Ground Crew (3) and
Ground Crew Injuries (3)
SpaceShipTwo Test Flight
October 31, 2014
Loss of Flight Crew (1)
and Flight Crew Injury (1)
Ares-1X Steel Rod Mishap
During Static Strip Test at
KSC Parachute
Refurbishment Facility
September 5, 2007
Ground Crew Injury (1)
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Study Inputs and References
• Detailed (micro) analysis of 6 HSF-1 mishaps
– 142 factors/causes in 6 HSF-1 mishaps where mishap investigation
reports were available
• High-level (macro) analysis of Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel (ASAP) recommendations
– 513 recommendations from 1972-2012
• Historical independent assessment reports
– Early Apollo Operations: Manned Space Programs Accident/Incident
Summaries (1970), Cranston Research, Inc.
– Early Shuttle Operations: Space Shuttle Productivity and Error Prevention
(1981), Anacapa Sciences
• Other special studies
– Readiness for First Crewed Flight (2011), NESC
– Technical Risk Identification at Program Inception (2014), Aerospace
Corporation
• Human Spaceflight SME inputs
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration13
Human Spaceflight SME’s
JSC:
• Bo Bejmuk
• Wayne Hale
• Gary Johnson
• Steve Lilley*
MSFC:
• Jim Blair
• Bob Ryan
• Don Hull*
WebEx:
• Mike Blythe
• Nancy Currie
• TK Mattingly
KSC:
• Jay Honeycutt
• Bob Lang
• Charlie Mars
• Gerry Schumann
• Bob Sieck
• Tip Talone
• John Tribe
• Donna Blankmann-
Alexander*
• Barbara Kanki*
• Tim Barth*
*Facilitators
Reminders from the independent review team:
• Mishaps depend on a specific situation and set of circumstances where the various
events, factors, and causes line up and lead to a bad day. In different situations, it is
possible that Challenger or Columbia-type tragedies could have occurred on STS-1.
• In human spaceflight, every mission should be treated as an inaugural mission.
Taxonomy of Mishap Causes
and Contributing Factors
Control System Factors
Dual Role Factors
Local Resource Factors
14
Typical Schedule Controls Influence Chain:
Taxonomy View
Control System Factors
Dual Role Factors
Local Resource Factors
16
Erosion
of Safety
Margin
Typical Schedule Controls
Influence Chain:
“Swiss Cheese” View
STS-1 Orbiter Aft Compartment Mishap:
Causes and Factors
Control System Factors
Dual Role Factors
Local Resource Factors
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• Insufficient technical controls or risk management practices
– Inadequate safety hazard/risk analysis, FMEA’s, technical reviews
• HSF-1 examples:
– Soyuz-1: The failure mode of the primary parachute's malfunction (jammed in its
container), which caused backup chute failure as well, was not accounted for in the
design.
– Ares-1X: Even though the parachute riser lines were approximately 4 times longer
than the riser lines on the Shuttle's drag chute, there was no requirement for
engineering to perform a first-time GSE DE loads analysis of the test set-up or a
readiness review for the initial Area-1X parachute static strip test.
– Skylab-1: “Despite six years of progressive reviews and certifications, two major
hazards eluded discovery until actual flight: aerodynamic load effects on the
meteoroid shield and aeroelastic interactions between the shield and its external
pressure environment during launch escaped otherwise rigorous design, research
and test engineers working under experienced and competent leadership.”
Study Results – Recurring Themes (1 of 5)
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• Flight and ground system design/development issues
– Inadequate testing and verification of system interfaces
• “Test as you fly, fly as you test”
– Inadequate trade-off analyses
• HSF-1 examples:
– Apollo-1: Teflon wire coating was chosen
for superior insulation, chemical inertness
and fire resistance. However, the soft,
unprotected, thick-wall Teflon was
susceptible to creep, cold-flow deformation
and abrasion. Teflon coating wore away
during installation and training. Exposed
electrical wiring cracked and contributed
to unending command module technical
problems during tests. Five days before
the fire, a frustrated Grissom hung a lemon
from his yard on the simulator.
– Soyuz-1: “In retrospect, the Soyuz-1 flight should not have been carried out at that
time. The spacecraft was insufficiently tested in space conditions, and it was
certainly not ready for the ambitious first mission it was scheduled to accomplish.”
– Scaled Composites: N2O tank design included several materials incompatible with
N2O. The tank lacked a burst disc to protect against rapid over-pressurization.
Study Results – Recurring Themes (2 of 5)
"We were too gung ho about the schedule and we locked out all of the problems we saw
each day in our work...Not one of us stood up and said, 'Dammit, stop!”
Gene Kranz to his team on the Monday morning following the Apollo-1 fire
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• Inadequate secondary verification methods
– Inadequate inspection requirements and methods for known materials, safety, and
contamination issues
– Secondary verifications, not necessarily more inspections
• System feedback
• Engineering evaluations
• HSF-1 examples:
– Apollo-1: Given the fragile nature of the Teflon coated wiring, inadequate attention
was given to the inspection of the wire bundles to detect abrasion or deformation.
– Soyuz-1: There was no requirement to inspect the parachute container for
contamination.
– Skylab-1: There was no system feedback
(such as a visual cue) to the technicians,
quality inspectors, and engineers that a
“tight fit” had not been achieved during
rigging. Inadequate quality inspections.
– STS-1: Applicable safety documents
did not have sufficient requirements
for atmosphere checks or verification
of an air purge before aft re-entry.
No oxygen deficiency monitoring
system in the aft.
STS-1 mishap report timeline of GN2 purge
continuing after pad was re-opened for work.
Study Results – Recurring Themes (3 of 5)
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• Ground processing task analysis and design issues
– Inadequate use of task analysis tools and standards during task design and initial
procedure development (human factors checklists, process-FMEA’s)
– Incomplete or unclear procedures
– Inadequate design of emergency/contingency/troubleshooting/nonstandard tasks
• Require AT LEAST same level of rigor in procedures, training, and system design for
contingency/off-nominal ops as planned/nominal ops
• HSF-1 examples:
– Apollo-1: The astronauts requested the
emergency egress simulation be added
to the end of the plug-out test because they
were 3 weeks from launch and had not yet
practiced an emergency escape yet. The
plug out test did not require all the hatches
be closed and locked.
– Skylab-1: Stowing and rigging the large, lightweight micrometeoroid shield to the
Orbital Work Shop (OWS) proved extremely difficult, requiring the coordinated action
of a large group of technicians. Despite considerable adjustments to the assembly of
the various panels, a snug fit between the shield and the OWS wall could not be
made.
– Ares-1X: The initial Ares I-X strip test set-up combined components (forklift, a
capstan winch, nylon break ties, and a nylon towline) in an untested combination.
The nylon towline used to extract the parachute released a dangerous amount of
stored energy upon failure.
Study Results - Recurring Themes (4 of 5)
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• Inadequate organizational learning
– Failures to learn from previous incidents or issues within the organization (similar
mishaps, close-calls, or other precursor events) as well as failures to learn from
previous, well-documented incidents outside the organization.
• HSF-1 examples:
– Apollo-1: There was an electrical fire of an
Apollo Command Module ECS test rig in a
vacuum chamber in 1966, well before the
Apollo-1 fire. The test was conducted under
a lower atmospheric pressure (only 5 psi to
simulate cabin pressure in space) but a
100% O2 environment. The test incident
report was classified.
– STS-1: Apollo-1 Congressional hearings uncovered a problem at KSC with timely
submittals of operational checkout procedures to Safety for review in 1967. STS-1
procedures had the same problem.
– Scaled Composites: Multiple OSHA citations were issued before the mishap
regarding lack of engineering controls to abate well-documented N2O storage and
handling hazards.
“There’s no shortage of lessons, but learning is the issue”
T.K. Mattingly
Command
Module
ECS test rig
Study Results – Recurring Themes (5 of 5)
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• Examples of little-known but significant HSF events
– Apollo Mission A-003 Little Joe II Launch Abort (Gary Johnson)*
– Apollo Mission A-201 Command Module Reaction Control System Loss (Gary Johnson)*
– Apollo 7 Mission AC electrical bus short (Gary Johnson)
– Apollo 10 Inadvertent LM Abort and Fuel Cell Failure (Gary Johnson)
– Apollo 14 Docking Problem (Gary Johnson)
– Apollo 15 Service Propulsion System Engine and Main Chute Failure (Gary Johnson)
– Apollo 16 SPS Secondary Yaw Gimbal Actuator Oscillations (Gary Johnson)
– Apollo 16 Lunar Rover Anomalies (Gary Johnson)
– Skylab 2 Hard Dock Problem (Gary Johnson)
– Skylab 3 Propellant Leak on Service Module (Gary Johnson)
– Skylab 4 Command Module loss of Pitch/Yaw RCS Control (Gary Johnson)
– Apollo-Soyuz Mission Command Module crew exposure to N2O4 (Gary Johnson)
– STS-1 Negative margins in Orbiter wing during ascent (Bo Bejmuk)
– STS-51F Abort Request Command near miss** (Wayne Hale)
– STS-55 Experiment Valve near miss** (Wayne Hale)
– STS-53 Approach near miss** (Wayne Hale)
– STS-114 Debris strike (Wayne Hale)
– STS-41C Dynamic Standby Computer failure near miss (Wayne Hale blog)
– STS-93 Launch scrub (Wayne Hale blogs)
– STS-93 SSME injector anomaly (Wayne Hale blogs)
* A NASA report exists, but is not easily available to need-to-know engineers.
** ”near miss” term used where no record of a NASA close call investigation was found in NMIS going back to 1985
• Potential enhancements to prevent missed learning opportunities
– Mishap Investigation NPR 8621.1.F; change criteria for “high visibility” close call
– New OCE requirement for “significant” Engineering Anomaly Investigation Report
.
Anomaly Investigation
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• Are any of the recurring themes identified in the study applicable?
– If so, have they been recognized? Are they being adequately addressed? What
current efforts are addressing them? Should new proactive risk reduction efforts be
initiated?
• Are there any emerging or unique safety and technical risks
associated with test and early operations phases that should be
considered?
• Are hazards and risks being openly and candidly communicated up
and down the management chain?
• What can we do to reverse the HSF-1 mishap trend?
Sample Questions for HSF Programs
“Risks identified are rarely realized, risks realized were rarely identified.”
Aerospace Corporation Study, “Technical Risk Identification at Program
Inception,” U.S. Space Program Mission Assurance Workshop, May 8, 2014
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“Turning Badness Into Goodness”
• January 27, 1967: Apollo-1 fire
– July 16, 1969: Apollo 11 launch
• April 24, 1967: Soyuz-1 parachute failures
– October 25, 1968: Soyuz-2 launch
• May 14, 1973: Skylab-1 loss of meteoroid shield during ascent
– May 25, 1973: Skylab-2 launch
• March 19, 1981: STS-1 aft compartment mishap
– April 12, 1981: STS-1 launch
• September 5, 2007: Ares-1X static strip test mishap
– October 28, 2009: Ares-1X launch
“We must challenge our assumptions, recognize our risks, and address each
difficulty directly and openly so that we can operate more safely and more
successfully than we did yesterday, or last month, or last year. We must always
strive to be better, and to do better.”
Chris Scolese, Day of Remembrance Memo, January 29, 2009
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• OSMA/NASA Safety Center
http://www.nasa.gov/offices/nsc/home/
– System Failure Case Studies
– NSC Cases of Interest
– NASA Mishap Investigation Board Reports
– Risk Management Handbook
– SMA Technical Excellence Program (STEP)
– Quality Audit, Assessment, and Review (QAAR)
– OSMA News and Safety Messages
– IV&V Services
• OCE/NASA Engineering and Safety Center
http://www.nasa.gov/offices/nesc/home/
– Independent Assessment Reports
– Technical Bulletins
– On-line NESC Academy Courses
– APPEL Courses and Case Studies
– NASA Knowledge Map
– Lessons Learned Information System
– DDT&E Best Practices Report
– Readiness for Crewed Flight Report
Available Resources
